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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURAL GOVERNMENTAL COST SHARE
PROGRAMS IN THE KENTUCKY RIVER WATERSHED

The purpose of this study is to review existing literature of factors that influence farmers’
decision to participate in conservation programs. This study is also intended to collect
county data and information on conservation programs and participation in the Kentucky
River watershed region, which can be analyzed and used to draw differences in
characteristics of the region that would suggest willingness to participate in a trading scheme
for improvements in water quality.
The results suggest that more participation in a trading scheme from some counties
than others should be expected. Counties with more farms and larger farms will probably
have higher rates of participation in conservation programs.
The cost-share amounts being paid by current government programs must be
considered as the minimum staring point to negotiate in a trading scheme. To target the
impact of watersheds, such as the Kentucky River in the Mississippi system, that discharges
significant amounts of pollutants into the Gulf of Mexico, policy makers and program
administrators should be advising and stimulating the adoption of practices with the best
abatement performance for such pollutants considering technical complementarity between
practices.
KEYWORDS: Conservation programs participation, market incentives, pollution abatement,
water quality trading, cost-share.

Pedro Miguel Fernandes da Costa
May 6, 2011

PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURAL GOVERNMENTAL COST SHARE
PROGRAMS IN THE KENTUCKY RIVER WATERSHED

By
Pedro Miguel Fernandes da Costa

Dr. Angelos Pagoulatos
Co‐Director of Thesis
Dr. Wuyang Hu
Co‐Director of Thesis
Dr. Michael R. Reed
Director of Graduate Studies
May 6, 2011

RULES FOR THE USE OF THESES
Unpublished theses submitted for the Master’s degree and deposited in the University of
Kentucky Library are as a rule open for inspection, but are to be used only with due regard
to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but quotations or
summaries of parts may be published only with the permission of the author, and with the
usual scholarly acknowledgments.
Extensive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part also requires the consent
of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Kentucky.
A library that borrows this thesis for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of
each user.
Name

Date

THESIS

Pedro Miguel Fernandes da Costa

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
2011

PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURAL GOVERNMENTAL COST SHARE
PROGRAMS IN THE KENTUCKY RIVER WATERSHED

THESIS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in the College of
Agriculture at the University of Kentucky
By
Pedro Miguel Fernandes da Costa
Lexington, Kentucky
Co-Directors: Dr. Angelos Pagoulatos , Professor of Agricultural Economics
and

Dr. Wuyang Hu, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics
Lexington, Kentucky
2011

Copyright © Pedro Miguel Fernandes da Costa 2011

In memory of my grandfather Sergio Monteiro da Costa

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following thesis, while an individual work, benefited from the insights and
direction of several people. It is a pleasure to thank those who made this thesis possible.
First, my Thesis Advisors, Dr. Angelos Pagoulatos, and Dr. Wuyang Hu, exemplify the high
quality scholarship to which I aspire. They provided timely and instructive comments and
evaluation at every stage of the thesis process. In addition, I owe my deepest gratitude to Dr.
Jack Schieffer. He has made available his support in a number of ways. His comments and
insights created an informative and interesting project with opportunities for future work.
Next, I wish to thank the complete Thesis Committee, each individual provided insights that
guided and challenged my thinking, substantially improving the finished product.
In addition to the technical and instrumental assistance above, I received equally
important assistance from family and friends. My wife, Maria Regina, provided on-going
support throughout the thesis process, encouragement, attention to my concerns, and caring
love. My mother, Vinceza, and my Father, Paulo Gil, instilled in me, from an early age,
desire and skills and prepared me for adversities and challenges in life. I am indebted to all
of them, to my brother Hugo, my grandparents, my brother and mother in law. Without
their support, this thesis would not have been possible.
Finally, my appreciation is also addressed to my fellow colleagues, faculty, and staff.
They were all part of my learning process and accomplishments throughout my stay in the
Agricultural Economics department.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................................................. iii
List of tables ....................................................................................................................................................... v
List of figures ..................................................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2. Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1. Market Incentives for a Water Quality Trading – Historical and theoretical assessment .. 3
2.2. The Gulf of Mexico Hypoxic zone ............................................................................................ 5
2.3. KY WQT drivers .......................................................................................................................... 8
2.3.1. Federal Regulations ...................................................................................................... 8
2.3.2. State Regulations .......................................................................................................... 9
2.3.3. Incentives to comply with regulations - conservation cost-share programs ....... 9
2.4. WQT most common uncertainty issues .................................................................................. 14
2.4.1. Stakeholders low participation in the U.S. WQT initiatives ................................ 14
2.4.2. Trading ratios .............................................................................................................. 16
2.5. WQT unintended consequences............................................................................................... 18
Chapter 3. Literature Review of farmers’ participation in conservation programs ................................ 20
3.1. Previous studies ........................................................................................................................... 20
3.2 .Relevant variables identified in the review of literature ........................................................ 23
Chapter 4. Model development ..................................................................................................................... 27
4.1. Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................... 27
4.2. The Kentucky River Watershed region ................................................................................... 29
4.3. Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................................... 34
Chapter 5. Model estimation results.............................................................................................................. 53
Chapter 6. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 55
References ......................................................................................................................................................... 59
VITA .................................................................................................................................................................. 62

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1. Summary of Conservation Programs offered in Kentucky ..................................................... 12
Table 3.1. Literature Review - Primary data ................................................................................................. 25
Table 3.2. Literature Review - Secondary data ............................................................................................ 26
Table 4.1. Kentucky River Watershed land uses relative to CRP payments ........................................... 36
Table 4.2. Kentucky Watershed Conservation payments .......................................................................... 38
Table 4.3. EQIP/WHIP conservation practices efficiency estimates of NPS pollution abatement of
N and P – Groundwater ................................................................................................................................. 41
Table 4.4. EQIP/WHIP conservation practices efficiency estimates of NPS pollution abatement of
N and P - Surface water .................................................................................................................................. 43
Table 4.5. Conservation practices efficiency estimates vs. EQIP/WHIP incentives received –
Groundwater .................................................................................................................................................... 46
Table 4.6. Conservation practices efficiency estimates vs. EQIP/WHIP incentives received –
Groundwater .................................................................................................................................................... 48
Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................................................... 50
Table 5.1. OLS Estimation Results ............................................................................................................... 53

v

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Cost-effectiveness and the emission permit system .................................................................. 4
Figure 2.1. The Mississippi River Basin System ............................................................................................ 6
Figure 2.2. Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone....................................................................................................... 6
Figure 4.1. Kentucky county boundaries perspective to the Kentucky River Watershed ..................... 30
Figure 4.2. Kentucky River Watershed ......................................................................................................... 31
Figure 4.3. Kentucky River Watershed - Land Uses................................................................................... 32
Figure 4.4. Total number of farms ................................................................................................................ 33
Figure 4.5. Total farmland acreage ................................................................................................................ 33
Figure 4.6. Kentucky River Watershed percentage of Land uses ............................................................. 34
Figure 4.7. Kentucky River Watershed Conservation payments .............................................................. 51
Figure 4.8. Land Uses ...................................................................................................................................... 52

vi

Chapter 1.

Introduction

The market for water pollution allowances could reduce costs of water pollution
mitigation, and increase efforts on reducing discharges of pollutants in the Kentucky River
Watershed. The intent of this study is to identify characteristics of farmer's, located in the
area of the Kentucky River Watershed that explains their participation in government
conservation programs. Therefore, suggest successful strategies to help create a permit
market for water pollution allowances in the Kentucky River Watershed.
In order to mitigate the pollution in the Kentucky River Watershed and subsequently
help achieve major reductions in pollution in the Gulf of Mexico region at low costs, a
market based program, Water Quality Trading (WQT) Policy, is being advised by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA, 2003) to the state of Kentucky. This
strategy, although encouraged throughout the country, is far from being successful in
achieving reduced costs and in lowering pollution due to low participation of stakeholders
(Breetz et al., 2004). Therefore, the need of understanding stakeholders’ concerns and
actions in order to engage in conservation programs is important.
The Kentucky River watershed carries significant quantities of nutrients and
sediment into the Ohio River basin, which is one of the sub-basins that contribute to the
discharge of these pollutants to the Gulf of Mexico. This interaction contributes to a
hypoxic zone in the gulf, an oxygen-depleted area that cannot support aquatic life. The
WQT Policy is being primarily targeted to access the Nitrogen (N) and Phosphorus (P)
pollution in this Kentucky watershed region. Industry, commercial facilities, municipal water
treatment facilities for example are major contributors to this pollution, and commonly
identified as point sources (PS) of pollution. In addition, agriculture and silviculture are also
examples of nutrient pollution sources, and are commonly identified as nonpoint sources
(NPS) of pollution.
Robust participation by agriculture in a trading program can overcome challenges in
programs that might lack the authority or incentives to engage producers in water quality
initiatives (Rowles, 2005). To assist in understanding if an economic incentive approach
would be feasible in the state of Kentucky, specifically in the Kentucky River Watershed,
1

information on participation of conservation programs in the state can help identify
characteristics that explain farmers and landowner’s willingness in participating in a WQT
program.

Information in the area of the Kentucky River Watershed on selected

socioeconomic characteristics, county farmland uses, as well as mechanisms of
communication and outreach with farmers that tend to reduce mistrust in program
administrators, will be assessed to understand the likelihood of voluntary adoption decision
of conservation programs.
The first objective of this study is to review existing literature that examines farmer
adoption of conservation practices. In particular, the interest of this study will be in the
review of studies that specifically address factors that influence farmer’s decision to
participate on public conservation programs.
The second objective is to review existing literature and identify what potential
problems exist when instituting a WQT. Factors identified in the literature can potentially
explain farmers' behavior in adopting conservation practices, and their participation in
conservation programs.

The characteristics of farmers that participate in conservation

programs could predict WQT participation in the Kentucky River watershed.

Using

secondary data, one can identify counties within the Kentucky River watershed that may
have the characteristics that may predict a higher rate of participation in Water Quality
trading scheme then others.
The third objective is to collect county data and information on conservation
programs and participation in the Kentucky River watershed region, which can be analyzed
and used to draw differences in characteristics in the forty-six counties that would suggest
willingness to participate in a trading scheme for improvements in water quality.

2

Chapter 2.

2.1.

Background

Market Incentives for a Water Quality Trading – Historical and theoretical
assessment

The right to use a resource relates to property rights as first propounded in a paper
by Ronald Coase (1960). Coase observed that it is more cost-effective to install private
property rights and make them transferable to let a market determine their price, rather than
to impose general limits on pollution, or fixing a price by installing environmental taxes.
The general model of tradable property rights, and the idea that markets of pollution rights
are an alternative policy instrument to pollution taxes as a way of achieving a target
reduction in pollution, was historically proposed a few years later by Thomas D. Crocker
(1966) for air emissions and by John H. Dales (1968) for water pollution.
The market treats as demand for the rights of pollution permits the marginal
abatement cost curve of each polluter. The demand for pollution permits can be higher or
lower depending on the effectiveness of each polluter. If each permit to pollute is seen as
needed for each unit of pollution to be discharged, then a regulatory authority can issue a
total number of permits. That total number of permits represents the total emissions that
the regulatory entity considers optimal in a given area, for a given pollutant, for a period of
time.
Polluters may purchase each permit at a given price, which will allow them to emit an
amount of pollution. However, if it is cheaper to abate pollution rather than buying permits,
then a polluter may consider it is less costly to abate and sell permits. If it is cheaper to buy
permits than to abate pollution, then that polluter will have a demand for permits. The
market exchange of these permits among polluters will lead to a cost minimization in
reducing a unit of pollution. Once the market is established, new entrants will either buy
permits from holders of existing permits, or they will invest in pollution control equipment.
If the regulatory authority wishes to restrict even further the overall pollution, at a future
time, they will issue less permits to reflect the new pollution standard that they wish to
impose (Pearce & Turner, 1990).
3

The emission permit system is illustrated in Figure 1, assuming two different sources
of pollution. The marginal cost of pollution control for the second source (C) is higher than
the first source (A). Hence, both sources have an incentive to trade. The second source can
lower its costs from buying a permit from the first source at a price lower than C. This will
be advantageous for the first source if it could sell a permit for a price higher than A. Trades
of permits will occur until the marginal value of a permit for both sources (B) is reached, and
there will be no more incentives to trade.

Figure 1.1. Cost-effectiveness and the emission permit system
Source: Tietenberg, Thomas H. (2006)
The Tar-Pamlico in North Carolina and the Dillon Lake in the Colorado are some of
the oldest WQT projects in the U.S. These existing programs were designed such that PS
polluters purchase emissions allowances from NPS polluters. The amount of allowances
purchased depends on the amount of expected runoff to be reduced by NPS polluters.
Under existing programs, expected runoff reductions from NPS in the basin occur through
installation of best-management practices (BMPs) and the development of nutrient
management plans. Under certain conditions, the determined price provides the correct
4

incentive for dischargers to arrange emissions levels such that a cost-minimizing solution is
reached. For example, costs of reducing agricultural NPS loads in a watershed may be less
than reducing PS loads, especially if PS discharges are already being constrained by a permit
program that controls water pollution by regulating PS that discharge pollutants into waters,
such as the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) of the Clean Water
Act (US EPA, 2003).
First suggested in the 1960s by economists considering how society could achieve
long-term reductions in pollution, without causing an undue burden on the economy, the
trading scheme allows polluters to re-allocate the right to pollute and decide who actually
does the pollution abatement. Those with high costs of abatement pollute more and abate
less, and those with low costs pollute less and abate more. To achieve an efficient reduction
of N and P pollution required by regulations, the installation of BMPs and/or development
of nutrient management plans by sources of pollution can create permits (rights) for
pollution emissions that could be traded (sold to) with less efficient sources of pollution.

2.2.

The Gulf of Mexico Hypoxic zone

The Upper Mississippi, Ohio, and Lower Mississippi River sub-basins discharge
significant quantities of nutrients and sediment to the Gulf of Mexico contributing to the
hypoxic zone, an oxygen-depleted area that cannot support aquatic life. The hypoxic zone in
the northern Gulf of Mexico refers to an area along the Louisiana-Texas coast, and is the
second largest hypoxic zone worldwide. Nutrient over-enrichment from anthropogenic
sources is one of the major stresses impacting coastal ecosystems. The excess nutrients and
sediments come from a wide range of PS and NPS, including runoff from atmospheric
deposition, urbanized land, soil erosion, agricultural fertilizers, animal feeding facilities,
municipal sewage treatment outfalls, and industrial discharges (EPA 2002). Figures 2.1 and
2.2 depict maps of the influence of discharges from the Mississippi’s basin system and the
Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone, one of the largest in the world.

5

Figure 2.1. The Mississippi River Basin System
Source: US EPA

Figure 2.2. Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone
Source: NOAA Satellite and Information System
6

Market-based approaches, such as water quality trading, that use innovative
programs for trading private property rights to reduce pollution emissions, have the potential
to accelerate the restoration of the Gulf of Mexico. Have also the potential to improve the
overall quality of water bodies along the Mississippi’s basin system, such as the Kentucky
River Watershed in the state of Kentucky, and help achieve pollution reduction at lower total
costs. Setting pollutant reduction targets and allowing sources to buy and sell credits to meet
those targets can make pollution reduction faster, easier, and cheaper to meet water quality
standards.
The initial intent of a Water Quality Trading program is for NPS (agriculture) to
supply cost-effective nutrient reductions in lieu of anticipated PS loading associated with
urban and industrial sources. As agriculture is a major NPS in the whole basin system that
impacts the Gulf hypoxic zone, including the Kentucky River Watershed (EPA 2002), it is
envisioned that trading opportunities in a water quality market with significant demand will
motivate producers to participate in such program. Robust participation by agriculture in a
trading program can overcome common challenges in traditional programs that lack the
authority or incentives to engage producers in water quality initiatives (Rowles 2005).
A market driver on a possible Water Quality Trading program in the Kentucky River
Watershed is the difference between the current amount of discharge, and the targeted
discharge amount. Permits will give the targeted discharge amount for PS. The Kentucky
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) could set these permits. Buyers are those
who have to meet the lower pollutant effluent limits than their current discharge, required by
the KPDES. Sellers are those who have less discharge to the watershed than their allocated
permits; in other words, sellers will have an “over control” or water quality credits. As a
result, the product to be traded on the proposed market will be the over control generated
by sellers. If sufficient trading potential exists within a watershed, the buyers may be able to
lower their cost of reducing discharge by the cheaper option of purchasing water quality
credits from the sellers.

7

2.3.

KY WQT drivers

Information from the KPDES shows that there are 256 municipal PS, 7,156
industrial PS, and 2,284 permits for private and commercial PS of discharges in the state of
Kentucky with 1,217 total sources in the Kentucky River Watershed.

These data

demonstrate the initial potential for demand for trading within the state. Moreover, available
information from the KPDES program, on the Kentucky Division of Water 2004 Report to
Congress on Water Quality (305[b] Report) shows that there are 1477.2 river miles affected
by agricultural sources of discharge, 924.7 river miles affected by Resource extraction, 721.3
river miles affected by Urban runoff/storm sewers, 1,059.2 river miles affected by habitat
modification, and other sources such as hydro modification, inappropriate waste
disposal/wildcat dumping, silviculture, septic disposal, spills, natural and unknown sources
that account for 2,496.9 river miles affected. These NPS represent a potential for adoption
of BMPs and the development of nutrient management plans to preserve water quality while
maintaining the economic value of Kentucky's land resources.

2.3.1. Federal Regulations

The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes the basic structure for regulating PS
discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States. Under the CWA, EPA has
implemented pollution control programs such as setting wastewater standards for the
industry. It has also set water quality standards for all contaminants in surface waters.
Furthermore, the CWA made it unlawful to discharge any pollutant from a PS into navigable
waters, unless a permit was obtained from EPA's NPDES (KPDES) permit program that
controls discharges. PS are defined as discrete conveyances such as pipes or man-made
ditches. Individual homes that are connected to a municipal system, use a septic system, or
do not have a surface discharge do not need an NPDES (KPDES) permit; however,
industrial, municipal, and other facilities must obtain permits if their discharges go directly to
surface waters. By issuing permits, the authority or regulator allocates rights for emissions
8

that will reduce current pollution, and will create a demand for permits for those PS that are
less efficient in an existent pollution trading scheme.

2.3.2. State Regulations

In order to protect surface and groundwater resources from pollution as a result of
agriculture and forestry (silviculture) activities, the Agriculture Water Quality Act (AWQA)
was created. The AWQA is the Kentucky’s water quality legislation, that was also created to
develop and improve BMPs in conservation plans, to develop statewide and regional
agricultural water quality plans, and to promote soil and water conservation activities. The
AWQA requires all landowners, with 10 or more acres being used for agriculture or
silviculture operations, to develop and implement a water quality plan based upon its state
plan guidance. And according to the AWQA, it is the sole responsibility of each of these
landowners and farm operators to develop and implement a water quality plan for their
individual operations (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.71-100).
Although the AWQA legislation forces NPS to comply with the regulations,
implementing conservation plans, there are no standards of water pollution based on NPS
pollution subject to penalties. This makes the process of creating a WQT system more
complicated because the property rights of pollution are not well defined for the NPS.
Nonetheless, one can still estimate the NPS current discharges of N and P pollutants, and
conceptualize a possible scenario for WQT scheme for the Kentucky River Watershed.

2.3.3. Incentives to comply with regulations - conservation cost-share programs

To help landowners and farmers adjust their operations and cope with costs of
compliance to adopt new technologies to prevent pollution, several government
conservation programs from different agencies are in place and can help with the adoption
of the water quality plans.

Government conservation programs can provide financial
9

incentives for farmers' participation on voluntary pollution control, having the potential for
significant cost savings when implementing conservation practices (Batte and Bacon 1995).
An overview of existing programs offered to NPS, mainly agriculture and silviculture, and its
related agencies and the nature of each program, is provided in Table 2.1. In this study, a
combination of these programs was tested to offer insight of farmers’ compliance with state
regulations, and their participation in conservation activities.
One of the programs is the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), a
voluntary based program that offers technical assistance and financial payments through up
to seventy five percent (75%) of cost-share contracts, for implementing conservation
practices (BMPs), to livestock, agricultural production, and nonindustrial private forestland.
This program is offered through the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) of
the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and its contracts generally last from
one year after the last conservation practice is implemented to a maximum term of ten years.
Also offered through the same agency is the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP),
which only differs from EQIP on its eligibility criterion of allowing conservation-minded
landowners who want to develop and improve fish and wildlife habitat on agricultural land,
nonindustrial private forestland, and tribal land (USDA NRCS Programs).
Another program tested is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which is a
program established by the USDA in 1985 that takes land prone to erosion out of
production for 10 to 15 years and devotes it to conservation uses. In return, farmers under
CRP receive an annual per-acre rent and half the costs of establishing an approved
permanent land cover, in exchange for retiring highly erodible or other environmentally
sensitive cropland for 10-15 years. The CRP is basically a land retirement program that
converts cropland into grasslands or forestlands. The program is funded through the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA),
with NRCS providing technical land eligibility determinations, conservation planning and
practice implementation (USDA NRCS Programs).
The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), the Farmable Wetlands Program (FWP) and
the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) are programs included under the
CRP program. These programs are voluntary, have specific land eligibility requirements, and
10

offer landowners financial incentives for conservation practices.

The CREP is a land

retirement program administered by USDA's FSA. By combining CRP resources, the CREP
targets conservation limited to specific geographic areas. Also administered by the FSA, The
FWP is targeted to producers in all states to restore up to one million acres of farmable
wetlands and associated buffers by improving the land’s hydrology and vegetation. Under
FWP Producers must plant long-term, resource-conserving covers to improve the quality of
water, control soil erosion and enhance wildlife habitat on land enrolled in CRP. In return,
FSA provides FWP participants with rental payments and cost-share assistance, and its
contract duration lasts between 10 and 15 years. The WRP is a conservation easement or a
cost-share restoration agreement with the USDA State of Kentucky NRCS, which benefits
wetlands on landowners’ property.

Under WRP, Landowners can choose between

agreements of permanent easements, 30-year easements, and restoration cost-share
agreements that can last at least 10 years (USDA NRCS Programs).
The conservation practices supported by the several conservation programs can also
generate NPS credits under WQT programs. In some cases such as the reduction of N and
P pollution, WQT schemes can be an alternative to programs that cannot cover specific
pollution standards.

WQT schemes not only have the potential to reduce costs of

compliance from regulations, but also reduce farmers’ dependency on government financial
assistance.
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Table 2.1. Summary of Conservation Programs offered in Kentucky
Program
Type
Goals
Mechanisms
1 Environmental Voluntary fi- Achieve environmental Payments to implement
Quality Incen- nancial assis- objectives- Improve water conservation practices
(BMPs)
tives Program
tance program quality
(EQIP) - NRCS

Length
Eligibility
Livestock; agricul- Up to 10 years
tural production;
non-industrial private; and forestland

12

2 Conservation Re- Voluntary
Conversion: cropland into Receive annual rental
Agricultural landContracts last for 10
serve Program land retiregrasslands or forest lands payments; and Costowners; and certain to 15 years
(CRP) - FSA
ment program
share assistance for up to marginal pastureland
50 % of the costs in es- (Rip. Buffers)
tablishing approved conservation practices - long
-term resource conserving covers on eligible
farmland

3 Wildlife Habitat Voluntary fi- Develop and improve
Technical assistance and Private and tribal
Incentive Pro- nancial assis- wildlife habitat - Upland, up to 75% cost-share
landowners
gram (WHIP) - tance program wetland, aquatic and other assistance
NRCS
types

Contracts/
agreements last 1
year after the last
conservation practice (BMPs)

Table 2.1. Summary of Conservation Programs offered in Kentucky (Cont.)
Program
Type
Goals
Mechanisms
4 Conservation
Voluntary fi- Undertake additional con- Annual land use payStewardship Pro- nancial assis- servation activities; con- ments based on consergram (CSP) tance program serve and enhance soil,
vation performance; and
NRCS
water, air, and related
supplemental payment
natural resources
for the adoption of resource-conserving crop
rotations
5 Grassland Reserve Program
(GRP) - NRCS

Eligibility
Length
Tribal agricultural
*Contracts/
land; private agricul- agreements last 1
tural land; nonyear after the last
industrial private for- conservation pracest lands
tice (BMPs)

13

Voluntary
Preservation and restora- Determined by the low- Landowners and op- 10, 15, 20 years or
rental contract tion of native grasslands; est of an appraisal, geo- erators
permanent
(conservation supporting grazing opera- graphic area rate cap, or
easement)
tions; protecting grasslandowner offer; pay a
lands from threats of con- flat rate per acre for the
version; maintaining and grassland value for each
improving plant and ani- year of the agreement;
mal biodiversity
covers the cost of the
appraisal, land surveys,
closing and recording
fees

6 Wetlands Reserve Voluntary
Protect, restore, and enProgram (WRP) - technical and hance wetlands
NRCS
financial assistance

Conservation easement; Landowners
and cost-share restoration agreement

Source: USDA (FSA; NRCS); Kentucky Division of Conservation and Division of Water

Permanent easements; 30-year easements; restoration
cost-share agreements of a minimum 10-year duration

2.4.

WQT most common uncertainty issues

Even though the federal and state incentives are in place to contribute to the
adoption of conservation practices on agriculture land in the state of Kentucky, conservation
measures can still create greater uncertainty about future productivity and profitability
(McSweeny and Kramer 1986). Farmers are averse to introducing more uncertainty and
vulnerability because their economic survival is already subject to a complex series of factors.
When farmers make decisions about farm management and conservation practices, such the
changes in weather patterns and markets, they might face substantial capital costs for new
equipment and opportunity costs, associated with taking land out of production or devoting
time to new practices.

2.4.1. Stakeholders low participation in the U.S. WQT initiatives

WQT has been applied for more than 20 years in the US (Breetz et al., 2004; Morgan
and Wolverton, 2005), but the great majority of WQT programs have not been very
successful. The results of the WQT initiatives including non-point sources are mixed, if not
negative, taking in consideration that few of the US initiatives have actually generated more
than a few trades (Woodward et al., 2002; Breetz et al., 2004; Morgan and Wolverton, 2005).
The examples considered successful were in terms of the implementation of the structure of
the programs, but have not succeeded on trading volumes.
Also according to Breetz et al. (2004) survey of all WQT programs in the United
States, between all the 40 WQT programs identified, only 12 allow the inclusion of
agricultural NPS. From the remaining 28 programs, some are non-agricultural NPS, some
other programs intend to include farmers but have not yet developed a trading framework,
and for some programs the inclusion of NPS is not allowed. Many of the 12 WQT
programs that included agriculture NPS in U.S. have yet to see a single trade, they range
from small pilots exploring the feasibility of trading, to sole-source offsets in which a single
PS negotiated a permit that included trading, to large programs providing multiple PS with
NPS credits.
14

It was found that the main barriers for the participation of farmers are the lack of
awareness of these systems, the lack of science, and no trust in program administrators
(Breetz et al., 2005). When approached with the ideas of WQT, farmers fear they will lose
autonomy in their farm operations, they also fear increased government oversight, and they
may resent the fact of being portrayed as polluters, because they view themselves as stewards
of the land and that they have a strong conservation ethic. Farmers also express their
resentment towards urbanites. They were reluctant to participate in some WQT programs
involving municipalities because they perceived their participation as an indirect way to fund
urban growth (Breetz et al., 2005).
Effective stakeholder involvement provides a method for identifying public concerns
and values, developing consensus among affected parties, producing efficient and effective
solutions through an open and inclusive process. Involving stakeholders builds trust and
support for the process and product, shares responsibility for decisions or actions, creates
solutions more likely to be adopted, leads to better, more cost-effective solutions, forges
stronger working relationships, enhances communication and coordination of resources, and
contributes to design parameters that mitigate uncertainty, market distortions, and political
transactions (Rowles 2005). Moreover, each stakeholder group is unique, and its makeup
and operation will depend on several factors such as the driving forces of the effort, the
agencies’ internal goals, and the geographic scale, the time frame needed for decision making,
the available budget, and the political climate. Before forming a stakeholder group, all of
these factors must be considered to determine the best way to proceed in considering a
WQT system.
Despite of none or low volume of trading, the programs were initiated by
stakeholder coalitions. Past studies and the EPA, identifies the involvement of stakeholders
as one of the primary objectives for the success in the development of WQT. Therefore,
supplying cost-effective pollutant reductions in lieu of anticipated PS loadings, associated
with urban and industrial sources.
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2.4.2. Trading ratios

There is a greater uncertainty in the determination of loads and load reductions in
trades that involve nonpoint sources due to factors such as the variability in precipitation,
variable performance of BMPs, and the effect of soils, cover and slope. The fate and
transport characteristics of pollutants also add uncertainty. For example, a pound of P
discharged upstream may not arrive as a pound of P at a downstream point due to diversions,
sediment deposition, or assimilation by plants.

Other factors to consider in trading

programs include providing incentives for achieving early loading reductions prior to
development of a permit and achieving nonpoint source loading reductions in the absence of
any regulatory requirements.
One method to address these factors is to use a trading ratio that is greater that 1:1
between nonpoint and point sources. A trading ratio is the ratio of the mass of pollutant
reduced using a BMP to the mass of pollutant that would need to be reduced at a treatment
plant through plant upgrades. For example, a trading ratio of 2:1 means that a BMP would
have to remove 2 pounds of P for a treatment plant to receive credit for 1 pound of P
reduction. It is possible that due to the geographic complexity of the watershed and
pollutant fate and transport characteristics, it may be difficult to establish very precise
trading ratios between all pairs of buyers/sellers.
Specifically, to determine trade ratios, one or more of the following factors,
whenever applicable, may be included:


Equivalency: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits to adjust for trading
different pollutants or different forms of the same pollutant;



Distance: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits when sources are directly
discharging to a water body of concern that accounts for the distance and unique
watershed features (e.g., hydrologic conditions) that will affect pollutant fate and
transport between trading partners;



Location: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits when sources are upstream of
a water body of concern that accounts for the distance and unique watershed
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features between a pollutant source and the downstream water body (e.g., bay,
estuary, lake, reservoir) or area of interest (e.g., a hypoxic zone in a water body);


Uncertainty: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits generated by nonpoint
sources that accounts for lack of information and risk associated with best
management practice measurement, implementation and performance; and/or



Retirement: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits to accelerate water quality
improvement. The ratio indicates the proportion of credits that must be purchased
in addition to the credits needed to meet regulatory obligations. These excess credits
are taken out of circulation (retired) to accelerate water quality improvement.
To address uncertainty and equivalence, Wisconsin used a formula to calculate site

specific trade ratios based on factors such as: is the trade in a targeted area; is the BMP in the
same watershed; how close is the BMP to the point source; is the BMP upstream or
downstream of the PS (Breetz et al., 2004).

Michigan’s approach to uncertainty and

equivalence is different. Its rules require that a set percentage of loading reductions be
contributed to the State to address uncertainty and to provide a net water quality benefit
(Breetz et al., 2004). For PS reductions, the rule requires a 10 percent contribution, which is
equivalent to a 1.11:1 trading ratio. NPS reductions require a 50 percent contribution, which
is equivalent to a 2:1 trading ratio. Additional discounts are applied to the use of credits in
certain situations to address equivalence.
For WQT systems that involve NPS and that target N and P pollution, the
uncertainty due to a trading ratio and the methods used to define it, greatly influence the
decision of stakeholder’s involvement. Therefore, a reliably estimated ratio for pollution
emission trades should improve with information from GIS models, local and state
stakeholder databases, EPA regional offices, and literature reporting trading ratios in
comparable regions.
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2.5.

WQT unintended consequences

Since trading, in effect, allows point sources to discharge above their base effluent
limits, it has the potential to cause adverse local water quality impacts. Where necessary,
NPDES (KPDES) permits and the trading mechanism should include provisions that limit
trading to ensure that adverse local impacts do not occur.

There is always risk of

catastrophic failure, whether traditional regulations are used or whether trading markets are
used. In the case of water quality, a catastrophic risk such as a spill, or an exceptionally large
release of nutrients or chemicals into a waterway, are not inherently larger with a trading
program. This need not change with pollution trading. There is no reason why safeguards
against spills (i.e. fines and other penalties) cannot be used in combination with a trading
program to minimize the possibility of a spill, or in the case of an actual spill, to help pay for
the cleanup.
A challenge for trading programs, are “hotspots” such as a stream segment below
the outfall for a wastewater treatment plant has worse water quality than the stream
segments above it (or below the hotspot). To address this possibility, monitoring data,
trading ratios and temporal or regional limits on trades should be proposed. These three
approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be adopted at the same time.
Monitoring data should be used to verify the location of a hotspot, which requires
the permitting authority and the trading authority (if there is any) to examine water quality
data on a regular basis to predict the occurrence of a hotspot, based on their best knowledge.
This may include modeling and data assessment and determine the availability of assimilative
capacity for the pollutant.

The presence of low flow areas, impoundments or other

environmental factors that would cause the pollutant to persist longer in the water stream
should also be considered. Mitigation methods should only be imposed if the regulators can
verify, with data, that hotspots actually exist or is unavoidable without the mitigation. For
example, if a hotspot is identified below a particular plant, then regulators may want to limit
trading entirely or they may want to impose a fairly strict trading ratio for that plant alone.
For water quality trading, monitoring data closely will increase the cost of operation but this
type of monitoring is essential.
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Trading ratios can be an effective way avoiding local impacts. Regulators can adjust
trading ratios to encourage and discourage certain trades. The possibility varying trading
ratios should be accommodated by the trading mechanism. An accompanying approach
regulators may use is to place a cap on the portion of its effluent limit that a point source can
replace with credits purchased from other dischargers through trading.
Temporal limits would be appropriate if, for instance, phosphorous is found to be
causing the nonattainment problem during low flow periods. If this is truly the case, then
regulators can write NPDES (KPDES) permits that make a distinction between high and
low flow periods (i.e. winter and summer months), and that allow firms to use nonpoint
source pollution credits only during certain months of the year. Water quality authority and
trade monitoring authority may also impose regional restrictions of trade, for example
allowing only upstream trades. A program design where buyers (PS) can purchase credits
only from upstream NPS is a protective limitation of water quality downstream of the point
source.

Economically, the limitation for upstream credit purchases has two major

ramifications for the trading program. First, credit supply and demand becomes localized.
In other words, any geographic location in the watershed has its own credit market and all
the local markets on the same stream are interconnected. Second, point sources located in
the upstream (headwater) areas of the watershed could be in a more competitive market for
credits because as one moves upstream, potential credit supply diminishes.
For a successful implementation of a WQT system, a feasibility study including
estimated costs of data monitoring, considering the change of trading ratios, the long-term
sustainability of the market, and considering implications of certain policies should be
conducted avoiding serious undesired consequences such as “hotspots”.
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Chapter 3.

3.1.

Literature Review of farmers’ participation in conservation programs

Previous studies

The success of the current incentives from government conservation programs, such
as CRP, given to farmers to address pollution abatement can be applied to market based
mechanisms, such as WQT schemes. There are a variety of studies that discuss the adoption
of conservation practices through conservation programs, its effectiveness, the participation
decision of landowners, farmers and other stakeholders. Although adoption of conservation
practices does not directly relates to participation in a WQT scheme, it could be useful to
identify certain factors which could be relevant in determining farmer decision in addressing
the use of technologies that reduce pollution.

Understanding the use of conservation

practices, also known as BMPs, are important to establish a connection between the decision
in addressing pollution abatement and the effectiveness of the current incentives being used.
There are a number of studies that relate the decision to adopt conservation practices,
or BMPs, with specific farmer characteristics and land uses. For example, Lynch and Lovell
(2003) discuss the factors influencing participation in farmland preservation programs,
specifically on both purchase of development rights and transfer of development rights.
With a survey of 836 farmland owners from certain counties in the state of Maryland, they
found that the farmers' willingness in engaging in a preservation program, increases with
farm size, growing crops, farm soils eligibility, the share of income from farming, and if a
child plans to continue farming. They also found that if farmers' own land closer to the
nearest city, they are less likely to join a preservation program.
Using farmers' characteristics, Breetz et al. (2005) conduct a study analyzing how
water quality trading programs in U.S. are related to communication mechanisms. From 12
case studies of WQT programs in the U.S. that involved agricultural NPS, they conclude that
by incorporating trusted social relations into water quality trading program such as,
trustworthy third parties intermediaries or existing relationships, with education and
outreach programs, could reduce farmers’ reluctance to participate in conservation programs.
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In a survey made to Louisiana dairy farmers, about their characteristics and the uses
of their land parcels, Paudel et al. (2008) assess the impact of socioeconomic attributes on
the BMPs adoption decision, relative to cost-share and fixed incentive payments. Their
analysis of the steps in the adoption decision process of BMPs indicated, that visits between
the producers and the U.S. Department of Agriculture–Natural Resource Conservation
Service significantly increase likelihood of BMP adoption, and that the low cost-share
percentage offered by the EQIP tends to reduce farmers’ adoption of conservation practices.
Producer willingness-to-pay results indicate that marginal increases in dairy BMP adoption
and associated improvement in environmental quality require increased technical and
financial assistance. The study also indicated that farmers with a higher level of education
attainment, and with lower debt-to-asset ratio, tend to be more likely prone in adopting in
certain conservation practices.
Rahelizatovo and Gillespie (2004), examine Louisiana dairy producers’ decision
adoption of BMPs in terms of the total number of practices implemented up to a certain
period. Their results emphasize that producers' would adopt greater number of technologies
depending on the information about their awareness of stricter regulations to control water
pollution from NPS, their dairy production performance and profitability, the size of their
dairy production plant, their risk aversion behavior, having constant contact with
Cooperative Extension Service personal, and have a stream running through their properties.
On the other hand, the greater the percentage of land owned, and the age of the farmer
negatively affects the number of BMPs adopted.
Ghazalian et al. (2009) from a survey on local farmers from Chaudièrie Watershed
region in Quebec, Canada, also investigate the determinants affecting producers’ adoption of
some BMPs. Education, gender, age, belonging to an agro-environment club, and on-farm
residence are found to have significant effects on the adoption of some BMPs. Farms with
larger animal production would be more apt to implement manure management practices,
crop rotation, and riparian buffer strips. Also, farms with larger cultivated acres would be
more inclined to implement herbicide control practices, crop rotation, and riparian buffer
strips. The price of labor has a negative impact on the implementation of crop rotation
cycles, but a positive impact implementing manure management practices.
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Suter et al. (2008) analyze participation in land retirement programs, in the binarychoice setting of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), using data from
218 counties in six states. Their results suggest that landowners react positively to the
incentives that are offered from the program. The results also suggests that increases in onetime incentives, offered at the time of signup, are a more cost-effective means to increase
enrollment than increases in the incentives offered on an annual basis.
With an empirical study, Chouinard et al. (2008) hypothesize that there are farmers
that are willing to forego some profit to voluntary engage in farm practices without
monetary incentives. Using a Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), they provide evidence
that some farmers are willing to make this sacrifice. Their independent variables include the
bid amount the producer is responding to, and producer characteristics. The dependent
variable is a response for each bid amount associated with an increased level of stewardship.
Kurkalova et al. (2006) propose a method of directly estimating the financial
incentives required for adopting conservation tillage, and distinguishing between the
expected payoff and premium of adoption based on the observed behavior. Their method
finds that the premium may play a significant role in farmers’ adoption decisions. Applying
the method to the state of Iowa, they find that if a uniform conservation tillage adoption
subsidy program were offered in 1992, over 86% of the subsidy program payments would be
an income transfer to existing and low-cost adopters.
Examining the effects of land use policies on watershed ecosystems through their
effect on land use, Langpap et al. (2008) study results suggest that land use policies based on
monetary incentives and property acquisition programs, can have relatively large positive
impacts on watershed health, while policies that change the returns to land use are less
effective. Their results also suggest that there is potential for targeting these policies because
their impacts vary across watersheds with different land use mixes.
Other than the categories of research on the adoption decision of conservation
practices and the participation decision to the incentives offered to farmers, there is the
study of Paudel et al. (2003) that investigated the environmental impacts of alternative
agricultural practices, within a watershed under different water quality standards. Their
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results indicated that stricter environmental standards lower total profit potential and litter
utilization.
Understanding the factors that influence participation in voluntary programs is
important when evaluating existing programs and determining new conditions for those
programs as well as when developing new programs. Land uses and farm characteristics, as
well as community characteristics are relevant if one wants to determine the probability that
farmers will participate in conservation programs.

3.2.

Relevant variables identified in the review of literature

From the mentioned studies, it appears that several variables were recognized as
being important in determining farmer adoption of conservation practices (Table 3.1 and
3.2). Variables on land, farmer, county and community characteristics, as well as net returns
from farming were recognized from the studies of the literature reviewed that collected
primary data (Surveys) for analysis (table 3.1). The most used and relevant variables from
the land uses category seem to be the number of acres of cultivated land and the farm size.
From the farmer characteristics list, the age of primary operator, the education attainment,
outreach, such as extension services, and the source of information a farmer receives for its
activities, were also relevant in determining farmer adoption of conservation practices.
Similarly, literature reviewed indicated that several studies collected and analyzed
secondary data in order to understand farmers’ participation in conservation programs.
Variables on land, farmer, community characteristics, and net returns from farming were
identified (Table 3.2). Farm size, incentive payments from conservation programs, and the
land use were the most relevant and used variables. The separation of studies based on
primary versus secondary data was made because of the relative difficulty in repeating studies
with data primary in other areas of the country without the expense and effort to administer
a survey.
The literature reviewed does not address the relationship of the level of cost-share
funding from government conservation programs, with specific county characteristics, multi23

program participation, and the Extension Service impact on the programs participation, in
the Kentucky River Watershed region. Operator characteristics such education attainment
and outreach programs seem to help in the adoption of conservation practices, reduce
transaction costs, alleviate social constraints such as mistrust in regulators and help with
more permanent and cost-effective solutions. The age of the primary operator of a farm can
have either a negative or positive impact in the enrollment of a conservation program. This
may occur if the older the operator is, the less likely to adopt a BMP, because the operator
will be less inclined to plan over a long horizon, and because they may be less aware of the
new practices. On the other hand, older producers might have more experience with a wide
range of practices therefore, therefore, more likely to adopt BMPs. Larger farms seem to
have a positive influence in landowner’s opportunity costs of enrollment as well as the
number of acres of cultivated land. Farmers with these land uses seem to believe that
adopting BMPs is a risk-reducing strategy.

The farmers’ source of information is of

relevance because could provide awareness about the benefits of conservation practices and
the conservation programs cost-share. Therefore farmers’ source of information could
positively impact in the adoption of conservation practices, or impact in the participation of
conservation programs.
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Table 3.1. Literature Review - Primary data
Data
Significant Variables
Categories
Land uses

# Acres of cultivated land
% Prime soils
Farm is contiguous to a preserved land
Farm size = # Acres
Having a biological/organic production certificate
Machinery and equipment
Minimum Acreage eligibility requirement
Presence of a stream in the farm
Soil eligibility requirement
Total # of cows in the dairy herd (farm size variable)

Farmers’
# Years of family owned farm
characteristics Age of the primary operator
Child to continue farming
Gender = Female
Education attainment
Membership in an agro-environmental club
Owning a Farm
Producers awareness of Govt. regulations to control NPS
(CWA)
Risk aversion on technology adoption
Source of information
Whether primary residence is on farm
County
Distance to the nearest urban area
characteristics Specific County
Net returns

Net Returns from agriculture
Size/value of animal production
Low cost-share % offered from EQIP
Price of labor ($/hour)
Higher milk yield
Less than 25% income from farm
Debt-to-asset ratio less than 20%
Low cost-share % offered from EQIP

Community Building on existing networks
characteristics Outreach
Third-party facilitation
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Table 3.2. Literature Review - Secondary data
Data
Significant Variables
Categories
Land uses

Land slope
Mean of daily max temperature during growing season
Mean of daily min temperature during growing season
Variance of daily precipitation during growing season
Soil permeability
Soil available water capacity
% of irrigated cropland/county

Farmers’
Operators working off-farm/total county farm operators
characteristics Harvested cropland operated by tenants/total county-harvested
cropland
County average farm operator age
Gender = Male operators/total county farm operators
Net returns

Net returns to conventional tillage of (corn, soybeans and other crops)
Returns to land use
Expected growth of returns to each land use
AVG annual incentive per acre offered to farmers
AVG annualized one-time incentive less cost of enrollment

Community Income/capita
characteristics Population density
Education attainment
Unemployment rate
Republican vote (proportion)
Voter turnout (proportion)
Renter households (proportion)
Urban influence index
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Chapter 4.

4.1.

Model development

Theoretical framework

In the previous section, several variables that affect the participation and level of
participation of farmers in conservation programs were identified from the literature. Farm
operator participation in a WQT scheme presupposes that the farmers have some positive
predisposition toward conservation programs. This predisposition is influenced not only by
the size of the farm but also by the type of cultivation undertaken. In a given county, it
would be expected that the more the number of farms, the more the participation in
conservation programs. Counties with larger average farm size would probably have a
higher level of participation. The type of farm activities (crops, pasture, silviculture, etc.)
would also affect the participation, and level of participation in specific programs that are
targeting certain types of land uses.
In this study, explaining the government payments for conservation practices made
in a county based on land uses is of interest. It would then be possible to predict if in a
particular county of this study region, there is farmland with features that would make them
potentially eligible to participate in a WQT scheme, and also test the interaction between
different programs with different criteria for land characteristics eligibility. Information on
government payments for conservation practices by county could be explained by the
following equation:
CRP = β0 + β1 NFarms + β2 AVGFarm + β3 TPCropuse + β4 TPPastureuse + β5 EQIP +
β6 WHIP + β7 EXTENSION + ε.
Where the dependent variable CRP consists of direct payments as defined by the 2002 Farm
Bill made in 2007 to farmers in the Kentucky River Watershed; payments from Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), Farmable Wetlands Program
(FWP), and Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP).
The independent variables used in the equation are the number of farms in a county,
(NFarms), the average farm size per county (AVGFarm), the total percentage of cropland in
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a county (TPCropuse), the total percentage of pastureland in a county (TPPastureuse), the
dollar amount of EQIP payments made to farmers per county (EQIP), the dollar amount of
WHIP payments made to farmers per county (WHIP); and the number of the State of
Kentucky Extension Service Specialists contacts to farmers per county (EXTENSION).
The parameter estimates of each explanatory variable are represented respectively by β0
through β7, and the error term is represented by ε in the equation.
The level of government payments for conservation practices is tested to investigate
whether the counties from the study region, that receive more incentives from those
programs, tend to receive more EQIP or WHIP payments.

The effect that multiple

program participation may have on payments could be positive because, information related
to adoption of some of the programs is available through the same source, the USDA and
the Kentucky NRCS.
The number of farms is also tested to understand if it would positively correlate with
payments for conservation practices. One could assume that the more farms adopting a
program in a given county, the higher the tendency of the information about program
benefits being quickly spread and adopted. Also, the average farm size in a county is being
tested to see if positively correlate with government incentives. Larger farms with lower
capital costs and higher managerial ability (Alvarez and Arias, 2003) might be more aware of
future regulations and are taking advantage of the government benefits offered or more
specifically, from cost-share incentives of programs that implement conservation practices.
The percentage of cropland in a county is also being tested to investigate if tends to
be positively correlated with government incentives to adopt conservation practices (Lynch
and Lovell, 2003; Ghazalian et al., 2009). One could expect that the higher the percentage of
pastureland in a county, the lower the payments, because most programs are targeted for
land retirement, rewarding financially conversion of cropland into grasslands or forestlands.
Finally, the number of extension contacts, made by the Kentucky State agriculture
extension specialists, is tested to investigate whether it has an effect on the level of payments
in a county. Previous studies have used similar education and outreach measurements that
have positively contributed to a larger participation in conservation (Breetz et al., 2005;
Paudel et al., 2008; Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 2004; Ghazalian et al., 2009).
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4.2.

The Kentucky River Watershed region

As mentioned before, the region of study of this research is the Kentucky River
Watershed (Basin), which comprises the North Fork Kentucky, Middle Fork Kentucky,
South Fork Kentucky, Upper Kentucky, and Lower Kentucky sub-watersheds (sub-basins)
with their respective hydrologic unit codes (HUC-8) 05100201, 05100202, 05100203,
05100204, 05100205. The Kentucky River Basin (Figure 4.1) extends over much of the
central and eastern portions of the state. It includes all or parts of 46 counties and drains
approximately 7,000 square miles. One of the state’s fastest growing counties (Madison) and
one of the most impoverished counties (Owsley) are within the basin. The Kentucky River
basin discharges into the Ohio River. The main stem and tributaries consist of more than
15,000 miles of stream in 2,032 HUC-14 watersheds. In 2000, almost 775,000 people lived
in the basin. More than 60 municipalities draw water from the Kentucky River.

The North, Middle, and South Fork Watersheds occupy the mountainous terrain of
the Eastern Kentucky Coal Field (Figure 4.2). Sources of pollution within these watersheds
are often straight pipes and failing septic systems, contamination from runoff in populated
areas, as well as from logging, mining, and construction activities. The Upper Kentucky sub
basin includes the transition from resource extraction to agricultural production. Sources of
pollution include straight pipes and failing septic systems, pathogens and nutrients from
agricultural sources, and siltation from agriculture and construction activities. The Lower
Kentucky sub basin includes the most heavily populated regions of the basin including
Lexington and Frankfort. Sources of pollution in this sub basin are straight pipes and failing
septic systems, failing sanitary sewer systems, pathogens and nutrients from agriculture,
contamination from runoff in heavily settled areas, and siltation from agriculture and
construction activities. Between 2000 and 2003, there were more than 17,000 KPDES
pollution violations on the Kentucky River.
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Figure 4.2. Kentucky River Watershed
According to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, County data, from the USDA,
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), in all the counties of the study region there
are 27,841 farms, which represent 33% of all farms in the State, and 29% of the farmland
area in the State. Around 45% of the total area of the Kentucky River watershed is under
farmland. From the farmland area, 44% is under crop production and 28% is under pasture,
almost 23% is under forestland and around 5% represent other types of land uses (Figures
4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). Also according to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, County data, the
average size of farms in the entire State of Kentucky is around 164, and in the Kentucky
River watershed is slightly smaller, around 148 acres on average.
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Figure 4.3. Kentucky River Watershed - Land Uses
The diverse characteristics of the Kentucky River basin pose a challenge to a water
quality trading program, but they could also support an analysis with a rich coverage of
various buyers and sellers of water quality credits including non-industrial private forest land
owners, industrial, agricultural, and urban entities.
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33

5%

44%
Crop

23%

Pasture
Forest
Other
28%
Figure 4.6. Kentucky River Watershed percentage of Land uses

4.3.

Descriptive statistics

To examine which land uses can potentially explain farmers’ participation of certain
counties in the Kentucky River Watershed in conservation programs, county data from the
NASS (USDA) 2007 Census of Agriculture of county land uses was associated with data
from CRP payments made to farmers for each of the 46 counties in the Kentucky River
Watershed area. The CRP data obtained from the Census consisted of direct payments from
CRP, WRP and FWP. CREP data was not available for the Kentucky River watershed
region because the program is only being offered to farmers and landowners located in the
Green River watershed region (KDOC). According to the data collected, there is a diverse
range of farm sizes, number of farms, quantity of farmland, and land uses per county in
relation to total CRP payments received by county, and average CRP payments received per
farm in a county (Table 4.1). For example, the counties of Fayette and Jessamine are similar
in the number of farms, in the percentage of farm acreage and lands uses, but differ in the
amount of incentives received. The counties of Lincoln, Madison and Mercer have similar
cropland percentages but also differ in the amount of incentives received, and differ from
Breathitt and Pike counties, which have larger acreages of woodland and low number of
farmers. The differences around the region in respect of land uses can be important factors
to be considered when participating in conservation.
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In order to understand what relationships exist in multi-program participation of
farmers in certain counties in the study region, county data of the EQIP and WHIP
payments made to farmers from year 2006 to 2009 was acquired from the Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS) through Kentucky State Conservationists. The information
obtained combined with the CRP payments reveals differences between the payments of the
different programs in each county (Table 4.2). Counties that received the largest payments
in one of the conservation programs (CRP, EQIP or WHIP) do not necessarily received the
highest overall amount of payments. A combination of conservation payments information
with land uses in each county can help decide where one program (or more) is more
favorable than other, assessing different needs of each county (Table 4.1 and 4.2).
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Table 4.1. Kentucky River Watershed land uses in relation to CRP payments
#
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

% Agriculture Land Uses
County Area
#
Farmland Avg. Farm % Farm
(Acres)
Farms (Acres) Size (Acres) Land Cropland Pasture Woodland Other
uses
Anderson
130708
678
87,617
129
67.03% 49.83% 25.51% 20.09%
4.57%
Bell
231161
69
10,194
148
4.41% 40.07%
6.35%
49.12%
4.46%
Boone
164165
682
74,750
110
45.53% 47.92% 21.43% 24.11%
6.54%
Bourbon
186585
918
184,323
201
98.79% 46.94% 42.86%
5.11%
5.09%
Boyle
116885
649
94,233
145
80.62% 49.38% 28.76% 14.92%
6.94%
Breathitt
316922
199
43,540
219
13.74% 21.58% 10.82% 60.35%
7.25%
Carroll
87882
326
63,708
195
72.49% 40.38% 29.66% 26.13%
3.83%
Casey
285243
1,286 191,609
149
67.17% 40.64% 21.72% 34.05%
3.60%
Clark
163273
907
149,201
164
91.38% 46.22% 39.44% 10.34%
4.00%
Clay
301514
336
51,194
152
16.98% 29.23%
9.97%
55.12%
9.97%
Estill
163559
456
64,780
142
39.61% 34.80% 22.88% 36.73%
5.59%
Fayette
182713
810
135,969
168
74.42% 45.39% 39.27%
6.93%
8.41%
Franklin
135667
625
76,306
122
56.25% 45.74% 26.02% 23.65%
4.59%
Gallatin
67019
204
33,816
166
50.46% 46.00% 25.00% 21.00%
8.00%
Garrard
149697
821
121,673
148
81.28% 48.49% 35.96% 11.67%
3.88%
Grant
166848
959
114,965
120
68.90% 45.74% 28.47% 18.34%
7.45%
Harlan
299654
37
3,034
82
1.01% 22.74% 12.89% 59.49%
4.88%
Harrison
198294
1,083 161,777
149
81.58% 46.17% 33.70% 14.98%
5.15%
Henry
186295
962
146,399
152
78.58% 49.68% 25.98% 17.83%
6.51%
Jackson
221740
662
82,614
125
37.26% 40.80% 20.20% 33.70%
5.30%
Jessamine
111679
711
80,116
113
71.74% 47.08% 35.60% 11.04%
6.29%
Kenton
105564
481
42,544
88
40.30% 50.50% 24.60% 18.70%
6.10%
Knott
225800
46
6,937
151
3.07% 38.98% 29.42% 30.47%
1.12%
Knox
248184
376
51,115
136
20.60% 34.96% 23.32% 37.88%
3.84%
Counties

CRP Payments

Average Per
Farm CRP Payments

$18,756.00
$0.00
$5,775.00
$97,370.00
$15,720.00
$1,468.00
$9,630.00
$66,021.00
$26,271.00
$3,500.00
$18,960.00
$22,080.00
$5,048.00
$268.00
$15,111.00
$6,648.00
$0.00
$48,960.00
$21,926.00
$6,732.00
$8,708.00
$9,562.00
$0.00
D

$2,084.00
$0.00
$385.00
$1,391.00
$1,048.00
$367.00
$963.00
$1,119.00
$973.00
$700.00
$1,580.00
$920.00
$1,262.00
$67.00
$1,679.00
$554.00
$0.00
$1,530.00
$1,154.00
$561.00
$1,244.00
$1,366.00
$0.00
D

Table 4.1. Kentucky River Watershed land uses in relation to CRP payments (Cont.)
#

Counties
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25
Laurel
26
Lee
27
Leslie
28
Letcher
29
Lincoln
30
Madison
31
Magoffin
32
Menifee
33
Mercer
34 Montgomery
35
Morgan
36
Owen
37
Owsley
38
Perry
39
Pike
40
Powell
41 Rockcastle
42
Scott
43
Shelby
44
Trimble
45
Wolfe
46 Woodford
TOTAL

County Area
Farmland Avg. Farm % Farm
# Farms
(Acres)
(Acres) Size (Acres) Land
Cropland
283961
135182
258815
216977
215379
283632
197826
131771
162088
127246
245578
226702
126889
219255
504678
115254
203559
182651
246795
99976
142535
122868
8,896,668

1,012
186
23
66
1,278
1,328
470
331
1,111
685
795
864
195
57
70
236
727
930
1,651
489
342
712
27,841

102,489
29,419
5,642
3,617
178,315
218,194
61,620
43,110
141,437
106,957
136,303
157,932
35,857
10,661
14,228
32,763
90,435
139,044
205,286
65,098
57,701
119,087
4,027,609

101
158
245
55
140
164
131
130
127
156
171
183
184
187
203
139
124
150
124
133
169
167
148

36.09%
21.76%
2.18%
1.67%
82.79%
76.93%
31.15%
32.72%
87.26%
84.06%
55.50%
69.66%
28.26%
4.86%
2.82%
28.43%
44.43%
76.13%
83.18%
65.11%
40.48%
96.92%
45.27%

42.16%
31.43%
2.73%
20.93%
47.07%
49.77%
22.53%
34.99%
52.96%
50.39%
30.27%
43.85%
27.58%
22.46%
21.26%
41.27%
35.89%
44.99%
60.50%
39.75%
27.06%
42.61%
44%

% Agriculture Land Uses
Pasture
26.30%
14.49%
20.56%
16.26%
30.66%
31.56%
20.01%
20.87%
32.07%
30.40%
20.95%
28.59%
13.87%
17.12%
17.61%
15.27%
20.23%
33.86%
19.40%
20.21%
14.88%
41.52%
28%

Woodland Other uses
26.38%
51.28%
63.59%
53.14%
18.60%
15.28%
51.38%
40.51%
10.52%
13.78%
41.02%
22.10%
50.28%
57.34%
59.72%
39.72%
39.66%
16.20%
13.10%
33.44%
52.83%
8.47%
23%

(D) Cannot be disclosed
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) - 2007 CENSUS of Agriculture

5.16%
2.81%
15.85%
9.68%
3.67%
3.40%
6.07%
3.63%
4.45%
5.43%
7.76%
5.46%
8.27%
3.09%
1.41%
3.74%
4.23%
4.95%
7.00%
6.61%
5.22%
7.41%
5%

CRP Payments

Average Per
Farm CRP Payments

$4,602.00
$6,479.00
$0.00
$0.00
$50,820.00
$48,375.00
$1,944.00
$918.00
$17,052.00
$32,800.00
$16,422.00
$15,582.00
$513.00
D
$879.00
$6,489.00
$16,758.00
$7,520.00
$99,640.00
$14,916.00
$5,980.00
$11,136.00
$767,339.00

$354.00
$589.00
$0.00
$0.00
$2,310.00
$1,935.00
$243.00
$306.00
$406.00
$1,640.00
$966.00
$1,113.00
$171.00
D
$293.00
$721.00
$931.00
$940.00
$1,880.00
$1,243.00
$1,196.00
$928.00
$850.26

Table 4.2. Kentucky Watershed Conservation payments
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Counties
Anderson
Bell
Boone
Bourbon
Boyle
Breathitt
Carroll
Casey
Clark
Clay
Estill
Fayette
Franklin
Gallatin
Garrard
Grant
Harlan
Harrison
Henry
Jackson
Jessamine
Kenton
Knott
Knox
Laurel
Lee
Leslie
Letcher
Lincoln
Madison
Magoffin
Menifee
Mercer

CRP
Payments
$18,756.00
$0.00
$5,775.00
$97,370.00
$15,720.00
$1,468.00
$9,630.00
$66,021.00
$26,271.00
$3,500.00
$18,960.00
$22,080.00
$5,048.00
$268.00
$15,111.00
$6,648.00
$0.00
$48,960.00
$21,926.00
$6,732.00
$8,708.00
$9,562.00
$0.00
D
$4,602.00
$6,479.00
$0.00
$0.00
$50,820.00
$48,375.00
$1,944.00
$918.00
$17,052.00

EQIP
Payments
$0.00
$0.00
$140,874.55
$5,158.22
$107,637.87
$0.00
$0.00
$159,084.12
$58,841.83
$0.00
$57,427.32
$70,129.53
$42,929.56
$0.00
$0.00
$59,469.28
$0.00
$264,772.68
$109,988.19
$185,492.33
$82,897.82
$116,546.01
$0.00
$21,719.00
$0.00
$113,257.32
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$27,369.04
$0.00
$214,315.16
$293,034.98
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WHIP
Payments
$4,245.73
$0.00
$32,621.00
$0.00
$0.00
$5,143.52
$0.00
$34,781.70
$0.00
$0.00
$8,620.00
$0.00
$6,948.20
$8,474.17
$4,983.20
$13,674.50
$0.00
$50,136.58
$37,393.00
$0.00
$0.00
$28,470.00
$0.00
$1,896.40
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$4,436.00
$4,968.21
$0.00
$3,432.66
$0.00

Table 4.2. Kentucky Watershed Conservation payments (Cont.)
CRP
EQIP
WHIP
Payments
Payments
Payments
34 Montgomery
$32,800.00
$36,928.22
$0.00
35 Morgan
$16,422.00
$0.00
$3,415.25
36 Owen
$15,582.00
$22,115.74 $36,113.28
37 Owsley
$513.00
$10,483.67
$0.00
38 Perry
D
$0.00
$0.00
39 Pike
$879.00
$9,212.41
$0.00
40 Powell
$6,489.00
$0.00
$0.00
41 Rockcastle
$16,758.00
$7,806.99
$0.00
42 Scott
$7,520.00
$9,927.99
$0.00
43 Shelby
$99,640.00
$105,251.75
$9,414.00
44 Trimble
$14,916.00
$11,453.00
$0.00
45 Wolfe
$5,980.00
$28,493.87
$7,759.00
46 Woodford
$11,136.00
$100,991.93
$0.00
TOTAL
$767,339.00 $2,473,610.38 $306,926.40
(D) Cannot be disclosed
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) - 2007 CENSUS of
Agriculture; USDA KY NRCS.
#

Counties

Data from the Kentucky NRCS was also collected on what conservation practices
are being used by EQIP and WHIP program adopters, in the counties of the Kentucky River
Watershed region, and their relative efficiency towards surface and groundwater quality. The
data on the relative efficiency towards water quality, have a scale that ranges from -3 to 5,
where smaller numbers (-3, -2 and -1) represent that certain practices can have negative
impacts to the quality of the water than the practices represented with higher numbers.
Conversely, the practices with higher numbers (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) show that certain practices
can have greater benefits to water quality, and a 0 (zero) value shows that a practice being
use does not interfere with the current water quality. Therefore, the smaller the number is,
in the water quality efficiency scale for a conservation practice used, the worse the practice is
to water quality. Moreover, the higher the number is, the better the practice is for water
quality.
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The EQIP and WHIP conservation practices are represented in respect of their
water quality efficiency to abate N and P pollution (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Table 4.3 shows
EQIP and WHIP conservation practices estimated groundwater efficiency, and Table 4.4
represents estimated surface water efficiency. In both tables an overall efficiency was
calculated summing the entire efficiency ranking in the rows of each practice. An estimate
of the overall number of efficiency helps to identify what practices are more suitable for N
and P abatement on both ground and surface water. The conservation practices Riparian
Forest Buffer, Filter Strip, Conservation Cover and Nutrient Management seem to be the
most indicated in order to abate N and P for both ground and surface water. In the case of
surface water, the practices Access Control, Prescribed Grazing, Critical Area Planting and
Grassed Waterway also appear to have a relative good performance.
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41

42

43

44

However, when comparing the overall efficiency of the practices funded by EQIP
and WHIP, with the amounts of cost-share from the programs’ payments made to farmers,
and the number of times each practice was funded for the period of time the data is
representing (Tables 4.5 and 4.6), most of the EQIP and WHIP funding is directed towards
less efficient conservation practices in abating N and P, and this is true for both groundwater
and surface water quality. This is because technical complementarities among practices. For
example, watering facilities may not directly contribute to the reduction of pollution but if
used as complements to other practices could help reduce livestock access to streams, which
can increase concentrations of bacteria, suspended sediments and associated N and P
contaminants. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 also show the conservation practices funded by EQIP and
WHIP, separated in categories that are related to the different land uses observed in the 2007
Census of Agriculture county data for the total study region. The top funded and the more
frequent funded practices are related to pastureland use, also the majority of the incentives
are towards practices that impact conservation in pastureland use.
In addition, estimated unit costs of each practice were added to the analysis (Tables
4.5 and 4.6). Since the majority of EQIP and WHIP incentives cover 75% of these costs,
these are the minimum amounts to be considered for possible trading prices. For example,
if a farmer intends to reduce N and P pollution adopting a Filter Strip conservation practice,
she will be facing a cost of $417.93 per acre, but she will receive 75% of the cost ($313.45) as
an incentive if she had applied for WHIP or EQIP.
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48
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In conclusion, for a potential WQT, the practices to be investigated in order to
reduce NPS N and P pollution are the ones with the best performance of abatement cited
above. However, technical complementarities will have to be considered, as well as the costs
of each practice. Considering the costs of each practice, the amounts of cost-share being
offered by EQIP and WHIP will be required for a potential trading scheme.
Data was also collected from the Kentucky Cooperative Extension System reports
from the University of Kentucky, College of Agriculture, in the number of extension
contacts made by Kentucky state agriculture extension specialists from 2007 to 2009, in
order to test if it has an effect on the level of government and CRP payments in a county.
This information is used as a proxy in education and as measurement of outreach that might
positively contribute to a larger participation in conservation.
Based in the 46 counties from the Kentucky River Watershed region, the
information collected to test if land uses, multi-program participation, and the number of
extension contacts made by extension specialists and its relationships with the CRP
payments in a county offered significant insights (Figures 4.7 and 4.8, and Table 4.7). The
average value of CRP payment per county was US$19,675.36, while the EQIP average
payment per county was US$53,774.14 and the WHIP average payment per county was
US$6,672.31.
Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
CRP Payments (US$)
19,675.36
24,043.65
268.00
99,640.00
# Farms
605.24
403.97
23.00
1,651.00
Avg. farm size (acres)
148.15
35.25
55.00
245.00
% Pasture Land
0.14
0.12
0.00
0.42
% Crop Land
0.22
0.16
0.50
EQIP Payments (US$)
53,774.14
74,259.00
- 293,034.98
WHIP Payments (US$)
6,672.31
12,403.89
50,136.58
# Extension contacts
13,393.59
14,508.19
92,248.00
N = 46 Counties
Source: Cooperative Extension Service; NASS; FSA; USDA Kentucky NRCS
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70%

9%

21%

CRP Payments

EQIP Payments

WHIP Payments

Figure 4.7. Kentucky River Watershed Conservation payments
The land uses in the study region differ from the average farmland uses of each
county, only 22% of the total is farmland, and 14% of the total land is under pasture.
Forests must characterize most of the land in the region, as well the mountainous terrain
from the Eastern side of the state and the urban areas. On the other hand, the average farm
size of the study region, at about 148 acres, is very similar throughout the state, which is
around 164 acres on average. And finally, the number of contacts made by extension
specialists to farmers totals 13,393.59 on average by county from the period of the years
2007 to 2009.
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14%

22%
64%

% Pasture Land

% Crop Land

% Other

Figure 4.8. Land Uses
The study region has different dispersion of land uses than the state. Studying the
specific area of the Kentucky Watershed rather than the entire State of Kentucky, helps
understand the peculiarities of communities of important stakeholders in a possible WQT
system in this particular region. Aggregating information of land uses, information of
different programs participation, and information about education and outreach in the
Kentucky Watershed, is crucial. This aggregation of relevant information of this particular
region, leads to a series of analysis through an empirical model discussed in the following
section, with the intention of providing a comprehensive view in the participation in
conservation.
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Chapter 5.

Model estimation results

In order to identify a relationship of the level of CRP payments made to farmers in
each of the counties from our study region, with land uses, multi-program participation and
the Kentucky extension service, the payments were regressed on number of farms per
county, average farm size per county, percentage of cropland per county, percentage of
pastureland per county, EQIP payments per county, WHIP payments per county, and on the
total number of extension contacts made by KY state extension specialists on farmers
located on the study region.
The model for the equation previously presented is given by:
CRP = β0 + β1 NFarms + β2 AVGFarm + β3 TPCropuse + β4 TPPastureuse + β5 EQIP +
β6 WHIP + β7 EXTENSION + ε.
Estimation results of the OLS model for the equation on CRP payments are presented in
table 5.1.
Table 5.1. OLS Estimation Results
Variable

Coefficient
Std. Err.
Constant
-63,686.000***
19,383.00
# Farms
44.804***
12.46311
Avg. farm size (acres)
300.919***
110.82851
% Pasture Land
80015.000
55,971.00
% Crop Land
-80604.000
61,539.00
EQIP Payments (US$)
0.005
0.04088
WHIP Payments (US$)
-0.022
0.2329
# Extension contacts
-0.011
0.18999
0.544
Adj. R2
F-Value
7.470***
*, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels
respectively.
Sources: Cooperative Extension Service; NASS; FSA; USDA Kentucky NRCS
The adjusted R2 for the tested model is .544, therefore 54% of the variation in CRP
payments is explained by number of farms per county, average farm area, percentage of
cropland per county, percentage of pastureland per county, the level of EQIP payments per
county, the level of WHIP payments per county, and the total number of extension contacts
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made by KY state extension specialists. On the other hand, almost 46% of the variation in
CRP payments is not explained by the independent variables. The F-test shows that the
model is significant at 1% level.
Based on the regression analysis the results show that, the average numbers of farms
per county and average farm size per county of the study region have a positive relationship
with the participation in the CRP. If two counties from this study region have the same
average farm size per county, percentage of cropland per county, percentage of pastureland
per county, EQIP payments per county, WHIP payments per county, and total number of
extension contacts made by KY state extension specialists, but the number of farms of one
of the counties has one more farm than the other, one can predict that that the county with
one more farm to have a CRP payment $44.80 higher than the county with one less farm. In
addition, holding all other independent variables fixed, if the average farm size of a county
increases by one acre, then the CRP payment is projected to increase by $300.92. Thus,
counties with more farms, and larger farms, tend to be more responsive to CRP incentives.
This result can be explained because CRP sets aside crop acreage as conservation measure.
When comparing the relationship between the land uses, multi-program participation,
and the community characteristic of the extension service in the participation of counties in
the CRP payments, no significance was found. One may expect to find some level of
significance on such variables given the findings observed in the studies from the literature
reviewed. One of the reasons for finding insignificant results is the possibility of time lag
between the number of contacts made by extension service specialists and the conservation
payments being made during similar period. This can be solved by acquiring older periods
of data on extension contacts from the Kentucky Cooperative Extension service.
Furthermore, one would expect that education and outreach information, delivered from the
extension services, would demand more time to be spread and absorbed by communities
targeted before the action of engaging in conservation programs, or that maybe farmers
already had exposure to these programs from extension. Therefore, further exploration with
different education attainment maybe justified, because additional information from
extension services on conservation programs would not be relevant to the adoption decision.
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Chapter 6.

Conclusions

There are 1,217 PS of pollution in the Kentucky River Watershed, and 1477.2 river
miles affected by agricultural sources of pollution discharge.

With 27,841 farms the

Kentucky River Watershed has 33% of all farms in the State, and 29% of the farmland area
in the State. Around 45% of the total area of the Kentucky River watershed is under
farmland. From the farmland area, 44% is under crop production and 28% is under pasture,
almost 23% is under forestland and around 5% represent other types of land uses. The
average size of farms in the region is slightly smaller than the state’s average.
The diverse characteristics of the Kentucky River basin pose a challenge for a water
quality trading program, but they could also support an analysis with a rich coverage of
various buyers and sellers of water quality credits including non-industrial private forest land
owners, industrial, agricultural, and urban entities. The Kentucky River Watershed has
different dispersion of land uses than the state, enforcing the idea of studying the specific
area of the Kentucky Watershed rather than the entire State of Kentucky, which helps
understand the peculiarities of communities and important stakeholders in a possible WQT.
To achieve an efficient reduction of N and P pollution required by regulations, the
installation of BMPs and/or development of nutrient management plans by sources of
pollution can create permits for pollution emissions that could be traded with less efficient
sources of pollution. The product to be traded on the proposed market will be the over
control generated by sellers. WQT schemes can be an alternative to conservation programs
that cannot cover specific pollution standards. The involvement of stakeholders is one of
the primary objectives for the success in the development of WQT schemes, which not only
have the potential to reduce costs of compliance from regulations, but also reduce farmers’
dependency on government financial assistance.
However, literature on trading alert that during the last 20 years that these
mechanisms are being applied the results of the WQT initiatives including NPS are mixed, if
not negative. It was found that the main barriers for the participation of farmers are the lack
of awareness of these systems, the lack of science, and no trust in program administrators
(Breetz et al., 2005). When approached with the ideas of WQT, farmers fear they will lose
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autonomy in their farm operations, they also fear increased government oversight, and they
may resent the fact of being portrayed as polluters, because they view themselves as stewards
of the land and that they have a strong conservation ethic. Farmers also express their
resentment towards urbanities. They were reluctant to participate in some WQT programs
involving municipalities because they perceived their participation as an indirect way to fund
urban growth (Breetz et al., 2005).
Understanding the factors that influence participation in voluntary programs is
important when evaluating existing programs and determining new conditions for those
programs, as well as when developing new programs. Several studies were identified using
primary data of land uses such as soil eligibility, farms’ characteristics such as farm size,
county characteristics such as being near to an urban area, net returns from agriculture, or
community characteristics such as education, that explain behavior towards adoption of
conservation practices. Therefore, farmland uses as well as community characteristics are
relevant if one wants to determine the probability that farmers will participate in
conservation programs.
From the studies that used secondary data to investigate conservation adoption
through BMPs, significant factors and features were found that affect participation in
voluntary programs towards conservation. Within the most relevant factors, are the farmers’
characteristics, such the age of farmer operator, the land characteristics, such as soil and
climate, the net returns from farm and land use, and the community characteristics, such as
education attainment and population density.
Based on the findings from the literature, this study tested the relationships between
CRP participation, with number of farms per county, average farm size per county,
percentage of cropland per county, percentage of pastureland per county, EQIP payments
per county, WHIP payments per county, and on the total number of extension contacts
made by KY state extension specialists on farmers located in the study region.
From the results of this study, one could expect more participation in a trading
scheme from some counties than others. Counties with more farms and larger farms will
probably have higher rates of participation in conservation programs, since programs like the
CRP set aside crop acreage for land conservation.
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Relevant variables identified in previous studies that used secondary data on
conservation adoption, one can specify an equation that includes factors that influence CRP
participation, and conclude that in fact, farmers from certain counties respond to monetary
incentives if the right compensation for their opportunity costs is offered. One could also
think that, farmers of specific counties can indeed be aware of possible penalties if they do
not comply with the mandate of the Agricultural Water Quality Act. Moreover, due to the
increases of food commodity, prices the overall costs of conservation programs, such the
EQIP, will rise in order to maintain the level of contracts. Perhaps, with fears of not being
able to benefit much longer from government cost-share programs, that target standards to
reduce pollution, farmers are taking advantage of those programs to reduce their costs of
compliance with pollution abatement. Trading schemes that prove to be less costly could be
an alternative to some of the incentives these programs provide.
To define a model that would explain participation in a Water Quality Trading
scheme, in the Kentucky River watershed, is necessary to obtain farm level information.
Farm level information could be obtained from a survey conducted to farmers that would
ask their willingness to participate in such a scheme. A survey will also be important to
determine the price at which PS of pollution will want to trade with the NPS of pollution,
and the NPS will want to trade with PS, if PS has interest in engaging farmers to abate
pollution. Other than land use features, as previous studies revealed, farmer characteristics
such the age of primary operator, education attainment, the source of information a farmer
receives for its agriculture activities, farm income, farm net returns are some examples of
factors that can also be crucial in targeting important stakeholders in a WQT, and could be
included in a survey.
Accordingly to conservation practices costs of implementation, the cost-share
amounts being paid by government programs have to be considered for policy makers and
program administrators as the minimum staring point to negotiate in a trading scheme. In
fact, to target the problem of excess of N and P, and the impact of watersheds such as the
Kentucky River in the Mississippi system, that discharges significant quantities of these
pollutants into the Gulf of Mexico, policy makers and program administrators should be
advising and stimulating the adoption of practices with the best abatement performance for
such pollutants. For example, riparian forest buffers, filter strips, conservation covers and
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nutrient management seem to be the most indicated in the Kentucky River Watershed.
Moreover, practices should be suggested considering technical complementarities between
other practices.
Finally, there is satisfactory information with the analysis drawn in this study, about
several relationships between agricultural governmental cost-share programs, land uses, farm
characteristics, information captured from secondary data on costs of BMPs and its relative
efficiency, and with the addition of PS information on their location, the amounts of permits
given by authorities for the right to pollute, and with the help of GIS models, that will be
helpful to do more reliable inferences on the feasibility of a WQT. For example, given the
land uses of each county and the location of the PS, it will be possible to identify areas where
there are enough NPS and PS to create a market for tradable permits of N and P pollution.
This information could be also used to even discard certain locations because of the risk of
creating hot spots given the location of the polluters.
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